

“Sino-Japanese relations at the League of Nations“

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The objective of this presentation is to consider the Sino-Japanese relations at the League of Nations. Both Japanese diplomatic history and Chinese diplomatic history have focused on the League of Nations studies in recent years, due to the following two reasons. One is the re-evaluation of the League of Nations itself. This kind of re-evaluation is taking place from the perspective that public policies conducted by the League of Nations concerning education, public health, and drugs among others in the international arena may have played a significant and leading role in terms of the formation of the global governance in the first half of the 20th century. This is quite contrasting to the criticisms against the League of Nations, which emphasized the shortcomings of the LN, for reasons such as weak compulsory force in terms of security and that it could not ultimately prevent the outbreak of the WWII. Secondly, not only was the League of Nations significant in terms of providing an arena for power games among the Great Powers and between the US and USSR, but also in terms of providing an arena for small countries and newly independent countries to be involved in international relations and the formation of international order. Despite the fact that in many cases small countries were dependent actors in international politics, however, it was quite important for Asian countries where nationalism intensified during the 1920-30's, to be involved in the League of Nations as one “nation” and to conduct diplomacy in the international arena. At the League of Nations, there was the possibility of the formation of relations different from bi-lateral or regional relations.

In the previous international symposium organized by Prof. Asahiko Hanzawa at Hokkaido University in December 2003, I had presented a paper titled, “Continuity and Discontinuity: from the League to the UN – the East Asian Context” in the session “The Role of the United Nations in International Politics? A Historical Re-examination from the Member State’s Perspective”. The previous paper illustrated that there was continuity between the League of Nations and the United Nations, in the sense that both provided an arena for improving international status as well as prompt public policies or works for the formation of the modern nation-state. This argument relates to the two points mentioned above. However, the previous paper concentrated on the issue of the

League of Nations and United Nations from the perspective of Chinese diplomacy. Thus, in this symposium also organized by Prof. Hanzawa, building on the previous paper, the focus will be placed on the international relations in East Asia in the first half of the 20th century, especially on the Sino-Japanese relations under the League of Nations.

1. China's Membership to the League of Nations and Japan

At the 2nd Hague Peace Conference, Japan had criticized China as a third rate country for reasons such as the lack of legal system, which has been discussed in my article titled, "International Statue as a Symbol of Chinese Diplomacy" (*Kokusai Seiji*, Special Edition on China after the Tiananmen Square Incident, No. 145, Summer 2006). Moreover, during the period between the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference, China's diplomatic objectives were one, to participate in peace talks with the victor countries and to become one of the original member states at the League of Nations. The other objective was to recover German and Austrian rights in the Republic of China. Therefore, China had expressed her opposition to Japan's acquisition of German rights in China. As a result, China did not sign the Treaty of Versailles between Germany, and the Treaty of Sevres between Turkey for reasons due to extraterritoriality. However, China signed the Treaty of Saint-Germain between Austria, and based on the first article of the treaty, China became one of the original member states at the League of Nations.

At the time in Paris, the inaugural meeting of the League of Nations was being held. Not only was the League of Nations an organization for the formation of international order after the First World War, but also had a significant role as the 3rd Hague Peace Conference. On the other hand, there was a strong influence of Wilsonism in China. For China that was dealing with diplomatic issues such as ethnic self-determination, principles such as reason and justice were highly respected, which resulted in the heightened hope toward the League of Nations as an entity that embodied reason and justice. There was also heightened hope among the people that all problems would be resolved at the League of Nations under the name of "justice".

At the time, Chinese diplomats also had high hopes toward the League of Nations¹. Wellington Koo, who participated in the inaugural meeting of the League stated that, "I may be the first person in the Chinese government that looked upon this issue (international organization composed of all countries) favourably" and "it will be in the best interest of China to participate in such kind of international organization,"

¹ 1918年1月11日、外交部收駐美顧維鈞公使電(外交部檔案、〇三一三七、二一一)

because previous to the formation of the League, “China had experienced hardship in her relations with Western countries because there was no international organization that controlled the use of force in international relations that followed a set of international rules.”² Wellington Koo had requested to President Xu Shi Chang to advertise and advocate Wilson’s determination for the League of Nations within China, as well as send a letter that contains the following to President Wilson³:

President’s determination to organize the League of Nations, regardless of the size or strength of the country, to maintain reason and eternal peace in the world is truly admirable. Our people and I are deeply moved by your determination, and hope that the success of such League will transcend all over the world.

At the time, China had regarded the relations with the US as great importance, and tried to prevent the expansion of Japanese rights in China. China tried to develop its diplomacy by gaining U.S support not only through bi-lateral relations, but also within the international organization.

Between February and April, 1919, during the Paris Peace Conference, the Assembly of the League of Nations (comprised of 99 representatives excluding the Five Great Powers) met 15 times, and Rep. Wellington Koo participated in these meetings. Wellington Koo had made a speech as the plenipotentiary of ROC when President Wilson presented the draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Koo emphasized the population size of China and stated that, “should the Covenant of the League be enforced, then the unlawful conducts of the states can be prevented and world peace will be assured.”⁴ In the tenth article of the Covenant it stipulates the “territorial integrity and political independence” of member states, and should this be violated then the “Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.” China had consistently demanded the above at the Paris Peace Conference, and was also included in the meeting of the nine nations at the Washington Conference. The reason why China emphasized territorial integrity and political independence was due to their intention to acquire a comprehensive principle to resolve diplomatic issues, such as the Twenty-one Demands and Shandong issue, through negotiation with other nations.

As one of the five Great Powers, Japan did not oppose these general demands by China. There did exist somewhat an inconsistency between China, that wished to

²顧維鈞著·中国社会科学院近代史研究所訳『顧維鈞回憶錄』(第一分冊、中華書局、一九八七年、三九一頁)

³ 1918年12月30日、外交部收駐英施·駐美顧公使電(外交部檔案、〇三—三七、一三—二)

⁴ 1919年2月14日、「巴黎和會議全大會顧全權演說詞」、(外交部檔案、03—37、12—2)

resolve the Sandong and Twenty-one Demands issue through the inclusion of the principles of “territorial integrity and political independence” and Japan, who wished to keep the relations between such principles and specific issues rather vague. However, there was an agreement on the inclusion of such principles in the Covenant.

2. Sino-Japanese Relations with regard to the Article for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination

On the other hand, Japan also made claims for “just argument”. That is, the argument for the elimination of racial discrimination. In recent years there has been number of studies on this issue, however, there is no study on to what degree Japan had coordinated with other countries, including Asian countries, that have been discriminated, when Japan had proposed this issue. At the time, among the Commonwealth of Nations, when Australia opposed the Japanese proposal, there were reports that Australia was worried about Chinese immigrants and not that Japanese immigrants were not the issue, however, there is no indication that Japan tried to persuade China to act together for the issue at hand. According to the ROC Representative Wellington Koo, who participated in the preparation meeting of the League of Nations, the Japanese Representative Chinda who had raised the proposal for racial equality had “eyed” Koo to request the Chinese “amity” toward Japan, therefore Koo stated that the ROC plenipotentiary had interest in this issue, that he sympathized with the Japanese proposal, and that he wished to have the opportunity to make a statement from ROC. Wellington Koo’s statement has been recorded in the “Negotiation Process of the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (『人種差別撤廃交渉経過』)” of the Records of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was as follows: The Chinese Representative also has interest in this issue, and would like to express its sympathy with Japan, thus would like to state our opinion in a later date.”

Koo did make the above remark, and it is true that there is interest for China in the racial equality proposal, however, he was also aware that ROC should be cautious not to cause any problems with the U.S. who opposed the article on the elimination of racial discrimination. Moreover, he recognized that the objective of the Japanese proposal for the article for elimination of racial discrimination was to create cleavage between U.S. and China, and that ROC cannot play into the hands of Japan⁵. At the end, the results for the vote concerning the inclusion of the article for the elimination of racial discrimination were as follows:

In favour: French Representatives 2, Italian Representatives 2, Greek

⁵ 1919年2月15日、全權代表団第十八回会議記録（外交部档案、03 - 37、12 - 1）

Representative 1, Chinese Representative 1, Serbian Representative 1, Portuguese Representative 1, Czechoslovakian Representative 1, Japanese Representatives 2. (Britain, U.S., Poland, and Brazil opposed the proposal.)

China was in favour of the inclusion of the article, however, it demonstrated a passive consent during the process of deliberation, and did not actively support Japan on this proposal. Regarding this point, it is also important to mention that the issue of the elimination of racial discrimination was not particularly an issue of concern among the public opinion in China. In March 1919, the Japanese interpreter, Nakabatake, stationed in Peking, wrote up a report titled, "Issue of the elimination of racial discrimination and the Chinese people" (March 8th), and was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: In Paris, our proposal regarding the elimination of racial discrimination raised by our representatives was rejected at the Council of the League of Nations due to various problems, and this was reported to Peking by news telegram on the night of February 19th, and later reported as an editorial titled "Racial Issues and Peace Conference" in the March 20th edition of *Junten Daily* (順天時報) to rouse public opinion of the Chinese people. However, all newspapers written in Chinese characters did not report on the aforementioned telegram, and therefore not many people are aware of the racial issues...⁶

No other newspaper except for the Japanese newspaper *Junten Daily* reported on the results of the vote on the proposal.

3. Sino-Japanese Relations with regard to the Presentation of the Sandong Issue at the League of Nations

As mentioned earlier, China thought that various "irrationalities" will be resolved at the League of Nations. Especially concerning the issues concerning the Twenty-one Demands and Sandong, which occurred following the First World War, there was a notion that should it not be resolved at the Paris Peace Conference, that it would be resulted at the League of Nations. Moreover, the Foreign Affairs Ministry of China was seeking for the possibility of proposing the Sandong issue at the League of Nations.

On July 13th, 1919, Liu Zong Chang who was Paris, sent to the Foreign Affairs Ministry the proposal to present the Sandong issue at the League of Nations after signing the treaty between Austria and gaining membership, which became the remedial

⁶ 大正八年三月十九日本省接受[三月十日發]、内田外務大臣宛、在支那特命全權公使 小幡西吉「人種差別的撤廢問題ニ関スル件」 「国際連盟 人種差別撤廢」(第一卷) 2. 4. 2 2 (外務省保存記録)

measure for the time being. The Chinese Representatives had sought for the resolution of the Sandong issue at the Paris Peace Conference, however, after facing some difficulties at the peace conference, the Chinese Representatives started to anticipate the proposal of the issue at the League of Nations. On August 21st, Liu Zong Chang presented the three methods for the resolution of the Sandong issue. First, was that during the deliberation on the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles at the U.S. Congress, should the Treaty be ratified with the suspension on the Sandong issue, then there is a possibility for ROC to follow in line of the U.S. and sign the Treaty while suspending the Sandong issue. Second, should the U.S. congress completely ratify the Treaty without the suspension of the Sandong issue, then China could consider direct negotiation with Germany (in this case, China must take into consideration the various statements by Japan and minutes from the three nations meeting). Lastly, should the direct negotiation pose to be disadvantageous, then ROC should consider submitting it to the League, however, Germany had recognized bi-lateral negotiation⁷. As a dependent actor in international relations, China must decide on its policies depending on the moves by other countries, however, it is significant to note that the direct negotiation with Japan was not considered as an option.

On September 10th, 1919, ROC signed the Treaty of Saint Germain, and once the Treaty was ratified then China would attain membership to the League of Nations⁸. Moreover, on September 15th, the war was suspended at the order of the President, and the war was over for ROC⁹. Under these conditions, there were heightened demands for the submission of the Sandong issue to the League of Nations, from local “military clique” in China¹⁰.

However, ROC was not officially able to enter the League of Nations until 1920. This is because the Treaty of Saint Germain was not ratified at the Parliament. Wellington Koo and others were participating at meetings of the League of Nations, however, since their eligibility was ambiguous, they were not able to submit the Sandong issue at the League. On February 17th, Foreign Affairs Minsitry sent a telegram to Wellington Koo, and mentioned that the it will take time for the Treaty to be ratified because both the Upper and Lower Houses of the Parliament were out of session, and that opinions concerning Sandong varied among different groups, therefore measures were being taken to develop common understanding on the issue¹¹. Then in

⁷ 1919年8月24日収、法京陸總長電（外交部檔案、03-33、151-2）

⁸ 1919年9月13日収、駐法兵代辦電（外交部檔案、03-23、46-1）

⁹ 1919年9月16日發、駐外各使領館通電（外交部檔案、03-23、46-3）

¹⁰ 1919年10月9日収、甘肅省議會電（外交部檔案、03-37、3-5）

¹¹ 1920年2月17日發、法京顧公使（外交部檔案、03-23、47-1）

March, the resolution to this issue was rushed suddenly, because once the Treaty of Versailles is ratified and enforced in each country, then the rights to Sandong could be negotiated and turned over between Germany and Japan¹².

However, the possibility of submitting the Sandong issue to the League of Nations was declining. At the time, the U.S. Senate was intending to reject the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, thus the former British foreign minister Edward Grey went to Washington to request U.S. to enter the League of Nations, even if the ratification of the Treaty is suspended. Wellington Koo emphasized that China should pay more close attention to this kind of coordination between Britain and U.S.¹³.

On April 27th, 1920, Wellington Koo requested the ratification of the Treaty to the Foreign Affairs Ministry for the third time, following the first and second requests sent on January 27th and February 9th¹⁴. At this time, the ratification had still not taken place yet. The Foreign Affairs Ministry sent a memorandum regarding the procedure for ratification to the Secretariat Office of the State Council¹⁵, passed the Parliament on May 26th, officially signed by President Xu Shi Chang and ratified on June 18th. The notice of ratification finally arrived to the Representatives at the end of June, and on June 29th, 1920, ROC officially became a member state of the League of Nations.

However, ironically, on June 19th, the day after Xu Shi Chang signed the papers, an incident occurred that could hinder the Chinese submission of the Sandong issue to the League. That is, when Persia tried to propose the withdrawal of the Russian occupation forces in the Northern region to the League, the Council concluded that intervention would be difficult because there still is a possibility for direct negotiation¹⁶. This Persian case was certainly not very encouraging for ROC. However, on September 15th, the Foreign Affairs Ministry demanded to the plenipotentiary including Wellington Koo, to submit specific issues (Sandong, etc) to the League and then request for the revision to all treaties that goes against the principle of international equality¹⁷.

The first Assembly meeting of the League of Nations was held from November to December, 1920. At this session, the Chinese Representatives realized that the League of Nations would not function as an arena where China could resolve its specific issues. Article 31 of the Covenant recognized Monroe Doctrine and Regional

¹² 1920年3月22日収、國務院函（外交部檔案、03 - 37、4 - 1）

¹³ 1920年4月13日収、顧專使電「和會報告事」（外交部檔案、03 - 37、4 - 3）

¹⁴ 1920年4月27日収、法京顧專使電（外交部檔案、03 - 23、47 - 1）

¹⁵ 1920年5月13日發、國務院秘書庁（外交部檔案、03 - 23、47 - 1）

¹⁶ 1920年6月19日収、法京顧專使電（外交部檔案、03 - 37、4 - 3）

¹⁷ 1920年9月15日發、駐美顧・駐和唐公使「應提出國際連合會各項問題」（外交部檔案、03 - 37、4 - 4）

Understanding, which became the basis to justify Japan's hegemony in East Asia and the Ishii-Lansing Treaty. Moreover, China was not able to gain support from the permanent members of the Council regarding the submission of the Sandong Issue, and additionally, since U.S. did not join the League, China was could not secure a space in which it could submit the issue.

How did Japan perceive the situation? To jump to conclusion, Japan thought that it would be impossible for China to raise the Sandong issue at the League, because Britain and France both recognized the direct handing over of the Sandong rights to Japan from Germany, and also because U.S. did not participate in the League. It would impossible to submit individual issues to the League even when one referred to the Covenant, and since an agreement was formed among the Great Powers with the Treaty of Versailles, Japan considered that it would be difficult for China to seek resolution for the Sandong issue at the League of Nations. Foreign Minister Uchida stated the following at the end of April, 1920:

China wishes to discuss the Sandong issue at the League of Nations, however, the Peace Treaty has already been ratified by Britain and France, therefore, it is difficult to think that they would listen to China's proposal at this time. Moreover, at the Assembly meeting of the League of Nations, when the Chinese Representatives raised the issue of Sandong, President of the Assembly, Dekan, stated that the objective of the meeting is to discuss general issues rather than specific issues such as Sandong, therefore, the issue will not be adopted at the fourth Assembly meeting, and the issue is not something that should be adopted¹⁸.

The above notion did not change even when the Assembly meeting was getting close at the end of August, 1920, however, Foreign Minister Uchida indicated the both sides were getting prepared: At the Assembly meeting which is to be held in Geneva in the coming month of November, it is likely that China would propose the Sandong issue at the meeting, therefore we should make our own preparations based on such¹⁹.

However, by this time, Sandong issue was closely connected to the issue of continuation of the Japan-British Alliance, therefore, Sandong issue was not submitted to the League.

¹⁸ 大正九年四月廿六日、内田大臣ヨリ在仏松井大使「貴電五九二号末段ニ関シ」(山東問題 2. 4.2 26、日本外務省保存記録)

¹⁹ 大正九年八月廿六日、内田大臣ヨリ在支小幡公使電、(山東問題 2. 4.2 26、日本外務省保存記録)

4. Non Permanent Members of the Council and the Issue of Reforming the Council

As indicated in number of studies, the Chinese Representatives to the League of Nations, including Wellington Koo, addressed and deliberated on Article 4 that stipulated the procedure for selecting the members for the Council and committees. Out of the six committees, the selection procedure was first discussed at the Legal Committee. The Chairman of this Committee was the Balfour, from Britain, and the Vice-Chairman was Wellington Koo. Koo emphasized here the method of “regionalism” where out of the four non-permanent members of the Council, three would be selected from countries in Europe and the U.S., and one would be from countries other than in Europe and the U.S. (Asia, Africa, or Oceania)²⁰. This proposal was approved at the Legal Committee, and at the Assembly, thus the original four non-permanent members (Greece, Belgium, Brazil, Spain) of the Council were not chosen at the election. At the adoption of this regionalism, ROC was selected as one of the non-permanent member of the Council. The ROC has support from Asian countries such as Persia and Siam as well as countries in Central and Southern America, Commonwealth of Nations and France²¹. The membership of ROC to the non-permanent member of the Council was not only praised from those who were associated to Chinese foreign affairs, but also highly praised as “our country’s international glory” by the public²². This seat was maintained up to September 1921, until the second Assembly meeting, which was one month before the Washington Conference (four permanent members stayed through voting). After this, ROC was placed in a difficult situation due to the division of the country, not ratifying the revision proposal to the Covenant, and the overdue fees relating to the League, however, China maintained its seat by emphasizing “regionalism.”

Japan did not oppose the adoption of regionalism. However, when it became difficult for China to maintain its status as non-permanent member, there was no movement to support China. Japan did not try hard to secure the Asian spot as the representative of Asia.

When Germany officially became the member of the League after the Locarno Agreement in 1925, there was a plan to make Germany a permanent member of the Council. Due to this, many countries claimed the reorganization of the Council of the

²⁰ 「国际联合会第一届大会第一股報告」(戊)(外交部檔案、〇三—三八、三—一)

²¹ 「国际联合会第一届大会各股以外之報告」(戊)(外交部檔案、03—38、3—1)。The reason why Asian countries agreed to the Asian spot was because there was an agreement that all countries would take turn as representative.

²² Please refer to 1920年12月18日外交部收、「駐瑞士汪公使電」(外交部檔案、〇三—三八、一四—一)、羅羅「国际聯盟議會閉幕的感想」(『東方雜誌』一八卷一號、1921年1月10日)。

League of Nations, and there were arguments concerning the seats of the permanent members and non-permanent members. Some countries even declared that they would withdraw from the League if there is no attempt to coordinate the seats. Thus, the League held a special Assembly meeting on August 8th, which ordinarily is held on September, and the ROC, who aimed to become the non permanent member of the Council stated that should the number of seats of the permanent members of the Council increase due to Germany's membership, then that ROC would aim for a seat as a permanent member of the Council.²³

Poland, Spain, Sweden, and Brazil also aimed to become the permanent members of the Council, however, only Germany was approved, and thus regarding the other countries, it was decided that the issue would be discussed at the Assembly meeting in September, after the coordination by the new "Committee on the Reform of the Council". The ROC became a member of this committee, and emphasized the two points, the increase in the number of seats of the permanent and non-permanent members of the Council and regionalism. During the deliberation process, Japan supported regionalism regarding the non-permanent member of the Council, and that it stated that it wished for ROC to land a seat and that Japan would vote as such²⁴.

However, the conclusion reached by the committee was that the number of seats of the non-permanent members would increase by three but not the seats of the permanent members, and regionalism was confirmed. In terms of regionalism, out of the 9 seats 3 would be from Southern and Central America, and two seats out of the six remaining Representative of ROC claimed that Asia should occupy 2 seats, however, only 1 seat was secured for Asia. The Japanese Representative also agreed with the Chinese Representative on Asia occupying two seats. However, Spain, Brazil, and Poland opposed this and claimed that it would withdrawal, therefore, it was agreed that three out of the nine non-permanent members of the Council, would become "semi-permanent members" where renewal would be recognized (one country every election)²⁵. The 7th Assembly meeting was held on September 1926, and China was selected as a non-permanent member of the Council for the period of two years. This selection had significant meaning. This seat was maintained at the 8th Assembly meeting in 1927.

It can be said that in terms of the problems concerning the organization Council of the League of Nations, Japan conducted diplomacy that agreed with China's claims

²³ 「参与国际联合会德国入会案特别大会総報告」(外交部檔案、〇三—三八、二〇—一)

²⁴ Please refer to 1926年3月27日収、「駐日汪公使電」(外交部檔案、〇三—三八、一八—二).

²⁵ 1926年九月3日収、「日來弗朱代表電」(外交部檔案、03—38、20—1)

in general.

5. From Disappointment to the “Favorite Child of the League of Nations”

In 1928, the Nanking Government was established under the guidance of the Kuomintang (KMT) in the ROC. However, in the same year China lost in the election for the non-permanent member of the Council at the League of Nations, and also had to take responsibility of paying the overdue League fees of the Peking Government. Many people started to question the Chinese membership to the League of Nations, and there were even arguments that supported the withdrawal from the League. However, China was gaining attention again as an experimental arena for “international cooperation” in terms of public health construction of the League of Nations. The relations between China and the League of Nations improved, which is evident in the League’s decision to appropriate the debts left by the Peking Government to China as costs for international cooperation.

There was a discussion regarding the visit to China of Vice Secretary General of the League of Nations between January and March, 1929, Joseph Avenol, and Director of Public Health Reichman, and cooperation for public health projects²⁶, and in November 1930, the Chinese government officially invited Reichman to China in November 1930, and he visited China as the public health advisor to the Chinese government. Reichman requested the invitation of Sir Arthur Salter, the Director of Economics and Finance, and Robert Hass, the Director of Communication and Transportation to China, and the Chinese government accepted this request²⁷. In January 1931, the Chinese government officially invite Sir Slater and Hass, and the League accepted the invitation, and the two Directors visited China, toured around China, and moderated together with Director Reichman and with the Chinese government.

In April 1931, the Chinese government established a National Economic Committee to advance the national project, and requested comprehensive cooperation from the League of Nations, including training and dispatching human resources,

²⁶Please refer to 張力『国際合作在中国 国際連盟角色的考察, 1919—1946』(中央研究院近代史研究所、1999年). Also refer to Chapter 8 and 9 in 飯島渉『ペストと近代中国』(研文出版、2000年) and 福士由紀「国際連盟保健機関と上海—1930年代のコレラ予防」(『社会経済史学』70巻2号、2004年7月).

²⁷ Please refer to Arthur N. Young, *China's Nation Building Effort, 1927-1937: The Financial and Economic Record*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971.

technical support, and cultural cooperation²⁸. On May 19th, 1931, the Council of the League decided on dispatching committee members, and requested cooperation to concerned agencies (in terms of procedure, it is necessary to get consent from the Council). Representative Yoshizawa of Japan also approved of this²⁹. Within two years, the League dispatched committee members at the Director's level, and after the withdrawal of Japan on February 4th, 1933, the Secretariat of the League announced the communiqué for the assistance to China on April 10th, May 9th Reichman visited Nanking, June 30th a special committee was organized under the Council of the League, and decided to execute the plan in cooperation with the National Economic Committee of China, where Dr. Reichman became the technical representative of the National Economic Committee³⁰. Reichman arrived to China on October 3rd 1933, and until the end of his term in July 31st, 1934 worked together with Wang Jing Wei, Sun Ke, Song Ji Wen, who were members of the National Economic Committee (After the resignation of Song Ji Wen as Director of Finance, on December 8th Kong Xiang Zi takes place as Director of Finance, and Chiang Kai Sek as the Head of the Military Committee). Regarding his work during this period, Reichman reported in his "Report of the Technical Agent of the Council of his Mission in China: from the Date of his appointment until April 1st, 1934" to the Committee of the Council for Collaboration between the League of Nations and China.

From the Japanese perspective, the collaboration between the League of Nations and China and the isolation of Japan at the League of Nations seem to have advanced simultaneously. Moreover, Japan had considered getting involved in this assistance to China however, it was not welcomed by China. Juro Kishi, in his book titled, *We must Withdrawal from the League of Nations* (Asano Publishing, June 1932) [岸井寿郎『聯盟を脱退すべき』(浅野書店、1932年6月)] stated that, "The relations between the League of Nations and China became close in recent years, and seems as though the League has approached and dealt with China as it was the mother of an infant China" and that "China these days is not the China that had been traditionally excluded, and became a China that was nurtured and wrapped in the arms of the League of Nations". This kind of description can be seen elsewhere too. For example, after the withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations in 1933, in the *Complete Translation: Reports on the Technical Support to*

²⁸ 「宋部長與国聯秘書長書」(『申報』1931年4月29日)

²⁹ Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit, *Minutes of the Sixteenth Session*, Geneva, 1931, p.78.

³⁰ Please refer to 『顧維鈞回憶錄』(第二分冊)(中華書局、1985年、P.252-255) regarding the Special Committee. Please refer to 海野芳郎「『連盟』の对中国技術援助」(『國際連盟と日本』原書房、1972年所収、第四章) for the Japanese stance on the technical assistance to China by the League of Nations.

China by the League of Nations published by the Shanghai Mainichi Newspaper in 1934 described Reichman that made it possible to bring together Song Ji Wen and Jean Monnet for the realization of **cotton and wheat loan** 綿麦借款 as “the champion of the realization of the technical assistance policy toward China after the withdrawal of Japan from the League” and that the technical cooperation was “essentially a political maneuver to compete with Japan.”³¹ Zhang Li also states that “The League of Nations was an international organization that had no power in sanctioning aggressors, and only strengthen the technical cooperation with China to save China from falling into a meager condition, and prevented China from becoming a nation that was looked down upon by other countries,³²” however, the League was successful in a way to instill the feeling of isolation in Japan, the aggressor.

Conclusion

After the Manchurian Incident in 1931, the League of Nations became an arena that symbolized the opposition between Japan and China, and within the process from the dispatch of Lytton investigating team to the withdrawal of Japan, Japanese isolation became decisive. Sino-Japanese relations itself became the focal point at the League of Nations. However, there was some disparity between the delegation of Japan and China when the Manchurian Incident was reported to the League of Nations.

I have just received a simple telegram, however, detailed telegrams are being delivered to the Chinese delegation and the plenipotentiary of China, Dr. Shi Zhao Ji, is reporting the information to the Secretariat of the League of Nations. From the information from the Chinese delegation and from other sources, the Secretariat is quite distressed and even requested that deliberation be held at the Council, however, I have explained to them that the telegram from the Japanese government had stated that the incident will settle down and that it is not necessary to take it up at the Council. For a moment the Secretariat believed me, however, after the continuous delivery of information from the telegrams delivered to each delegation, in addition to the occupation of Feng Tian and Chang Chun by the Japanese Army, and the telegram that I received reporting that the Army is on its way to Xilin, the situation became quite complex³³.

When considering the Sino-Japanese relations at the League of Nations, we are able to see a somewhat different phase than the bi-lateral relations between Japan and

³¹ 『全訳 国際連盟対華技術合作報告書』(上海毎日新聞社、1934年、P.1「訳序」)

³² 張力前掲書『国際合作在中国 国際聯盟角色的考察, 1919—1946』(P.142)

³³ 芳澤謙吉『外交六十年』(自由アジア社、1958年、114-115頁)

China. From the Chinese perspective, the League of Nations was a place in which China could propose and resolve issues that could not be resolved between the two countries. Japan was able to prevent that from happening regarding the Shandong issue, however, could not during the Manchurian Incident, thus, the League of Nations became a place for conflict between Japan and China, and with the summary of Sino-Japanese relations in the modern era by the Lytton investigating team, issues such as textbooks and nationalism were deliberated upon. China was adamant in denying this. Wellington Koo emphasizes the role of Reichman in the Chinese decision making process regarding this case. According to Koo, it is likely that Reichman advised Chiang Kai Shek to reject bi-lateral negotiation and resolve issues at the League of Nations, in order to maintain the integrity of the League of Nations. Koo thought that it was unrealistic since there was no tool to prevent the Japanese military invasion, however, Reichman's proposal was taken into consideration³⁴.

However, the League of Nations did not manifest the conflict between Japan and China. For example, during the re-organization of the League of Nations in 1920's, Japan supported Chinese activities, or with respect to the article on the elimination of racial discrimination, China did consider its relations with the U.S., but voted in favour of Japan. Moreover, in the 1930's, even though Japan criticized the collaboration between the League of Nations and China, at the same time there was arguments that were in favour of getting involved in the cooperation with China. Similar things can be said about Sino-Japanese relations after Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations.

Finally, I would like to conclude today's presentation with some ideas regarding possible future themes.

Sino-Japanese relations at the League of Nations were asymmetric. That is to say, China tried to resolve individual issues such as Shandong issue through the channels of the League of Nations, and avoid bi-lateral negotiations with Japan. Therefore, many unresolved issues remained between Japan and China, and the Manchurian Incident became the first opportunity for Japan and China to deal with individual issues. I would like to further examine the effect of the pluralization of the negotiating arena on Sino-Japanese relations.

Secondly, this relates to the idea of negotiating arena, that Sino-Japanese relations in East Asia became complex and multi-variant which was the result of the pluralization of actors due to the internal political situation in China and Japan's rise to imperialism. However, the League of Nations was a "simple" arena, between nations, where the foreign affairs authorities

³⁴ 顧維鈞著・中国社会科学院近代史研究所訳『顧維鈞回憶錄』（中華書局、1983年、418頁）

of the central government were in charge. I would also like to examine the significance or the meaning that this characteristics had on Sino-Japanese relations.

Lastly, I would like to further examine individual issues, such as to what degree the League of Nations experience was taken into consideration when the Chinese proposed the issue of the elimination of racial discrimination at the time of constitution of the Covenant, and to what degree Japan was involved in the economic assistance toward China, after the withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations. Regarding the latter issue, I looked through Japanese diplomatic papers, but could not find anything that went beyond the research by Yoshitaka Umino.

This brings my presentation to a close. Thank you for your kind attention.

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